Book Reviews Claude Piché, Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie, FirstView Article.

This book contains the definitive statement of Franz Brentano's views on meta physics. It is made up of essays which were dictated by Brentano during the last ten years of his life, between 1907 and 1917. These dictations were assembled and edited by Alfred Kastil and first published by the Felix Meiner Verlag in 1933 under the title Kategorienlehre. Kastil added copious notes to Brentano's text. These notes have been included, with some slight omissions, in the present (...) edition; the bibliographical references have been brought up to date. Brentano's approach to philosophy is unfamiliar to many contemporay readers. I shall discuss below certain fundamental points which such readers are likely to find the most difficult. I believe that once these points are properly understood, then what Brentano has to say will be seen to be of first importance to philosophy. THE PRIMACY OF THE INTENTIONAL To understand Brentano's theory of being, one must realize that he appeals to what he calls inner perception for his paradigmatic uses of the word "is". For inner perception, according to Brentano, is the source of our knowledge of the nature of being, just as it is the source of our knowledge of the nature of truth and of the nature of good and evil. And what can be said about the being of things that are not apprehended in inner perception can be understood only by analogy with what we are able to say about ourselves as thinking subjects. (shrink)

Josef Pieper (1904–1997) wrote his autobiography in three distinct volumes. Composing one volume of his complete works in his Gesammelte Werke (Felix Meiner Verlag, 1995) edited by Berthold Wald, he writes on his early (1904–1945), middle (1945–1964), and late years (1964–1985). Between Ignatius Press and St. Augustine’s Press, Pieper’s autobiographical writings have been translated into English over the last three decades. The first volume, Noch wusste es niemand: Autobiographische Aufzeichnungen 1904–1945 (Kosel-Verlag, 1979), was translated into English (...) as No One Could Have Known: An Autobiography: The Early Years 1904–1945 (Ignatius, 1987). Three decades later the second volume, Noch nicht aller Tage Abend: Autobiographische Aufzeichnungen 1945–1964 (Kosel-Verlag, 1979), was published in English as Not Yet the Twilight: An Autobiography 1945–1964 (St. Augustine’s Press, 2017). Finally, the third volume, Eine Geschichte wie ein Strahl: Autobiographische Aufzeichnungen seit 1964 (Kosel-Verlag, 1988), has been published under the title A Journey to Point Omega: Autobiography from 1964 (St. Augustine’s Press, 2020). (shrink)

Ernst Cassirer, 2011, Symbolische Prägnanz, Ausdrucksphänomen und „Wiener Kreis“, Nachgelassene Manuskripte und Texte, vol. 4, ed. Christian Möckel, 478pp., Hamburg, Felix Meiner Verlag.

A review of Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten‘s Ästhetik. Latin-German edition. Trans., preface, notes, indexes by Dagmar Mirbach. 2 vols (vol. 1, pp. LXXX, 1--595; vol. 2, pp. IX, 596--1305). Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2007, ISBN 3787317732. This is the first complete German translation of the two volumes of Baumgarten’s Aesthetics from 1750 and 1758.

Die Hauptthese des Buches besteht darin, "die Zeit nicht als eine Abwertung der Ewigkeit zu denken, sondern als Verhältnis zu demjenigen, was, als von sich aus Unangleichbares, absolut Anderes, sich nicht durch die Erfahrung angleichen läßt, oder als Verhältnis zu dem, was, als von sich aus Unendliches, sich nicht begreifen läßt". Der Andere steht zum Ich im Verhältnis der Nicht-Gleichzeitigkeit (Diachronie), der "Distanz, die Nähe ist". Paradigmen solcher uneinholbaren Anderheit sind der Tod und das Weibliche. Levinas zeigt jedoch in "Le (...) temps et l'autre", wie es im Verhältnis zur Anderheit ein Durchbrechen der in sich verschlossenen Einsamkeit, ein wirkliches Transzendieren gibt, das nicht mehr Rückkehr des Selben zu sich ist. Die deutsche Übersetzung erschien 1984 erstmals im Felix Meiner Verlag und wurde von Ludwig Wenzler für die Neuausgabe (nun in der Philosophischen Bibliothek) korrigiert. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 239 die Herausgeber nicht mit, von wem. Jedem Dialog geht eine Gliederung voran; jeder Band ist mit einer recht brauchbaren Bibliographie versehen. Es ist erstaunlich zu erfahren, dass der erste Band, erstmalig in 1957 erschienen, in 1963 eine Auflage von 78000 erreicht hat; bleiben auch die Auflageziffern der fibrigen B~inde dahinter zurfick, so sind sie doch genfigend eindrucksvoll. Man wfinscht, der Verlag m6chte doch, durch diesen (...) Erfolg ermutigt, das nach Obgesagtem noch Fehlende--und dazu noch Platons Gedichte--in einem Erg~inzungsband bringen, wie immer man fiber die Echtheit der Stficke denkt. Der stilistische Unterschied zwischen den ~bersetzungen von Schleiermacher (erstmalig: 1804-1810) und von H. und F. H. Mfiller ist ausserordentlich. Dies ist nicht etwa auf die gr6ssere Sprachmeisterschaff Schleiermachers zurfickfiihren. Vielmehr liegt seiner Obersetzungsmethode eine h6chst interessante Theorie zugrunde (die F. A. Wolff, der Schleiermachers ~bersetzung verhShnt und Wilamowitz, der sie als ungeniessbar bezeichnet hatte, offenbar unbekannt war). Dieser Theorie zufolge ist es die Aufgabe des ~2bersetzers, den Leser besffindig daran zu erinnern, dass er nur eine l~bersetzung vor sich hat. Einem ~bersetzer, der sich brfistet, dass sich sein Text so liest, wie ihn der Autor geschrieben h~itte, wenn er in der Sprache des ~bersetzers und seines Publikums gedacht h~itte, sollte erwidert werden "Daffir bin ich dir so dankbar, wie ich es w~ire, wenn du mir das Bild eines Mannes zeigtest und sagtest--So wiirde er ausgesehen haben, wenn ihn mit seiner Mutter ein anderer Vater gezeugt h~tte." In anderen Worten: da sich Inhalt und Ausdruck nicht abtrennen lassen, sollte der f2bersetzer, start das Original seiner Sprache anzueignen, vielmehr--wir gebrauchen hier den bekannten Brechtschen Begriff--im Leser einen Verfremdungseffekt erzeugen. Wie man sieht, ist Schleiermachers ~3bersetzungstheorie jeder "rationalistischen " strikte entgegengesetzt; ja, man k6nnte sagen, dass sie das ganze Wesen des Romantisch-Irrationalen eben auf ein Einzelproblem, das des l~bersetzens angewendet, aufs beste ausdrfickt. Und Schleiermachers f2bersetzungspraxis entspricht genau seiner Theorie. Dies ist ihre Eigentfimlichkeit. Und ich denke, dass diese Theorie mehr Au{merksamkeit verdient, als ihr in den nie endenden Diskussionen darfiber, welchen Prinzipien der Obersetzer folgen sollte, geschenkt wird. PHILIP MERLAN Scripps College, Claremont, Calif. Platon der Erzieher. Von Julius Stenzel. Mit einer Einffihrung von Konrad Gaiser. (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1961. Pp. xxx + 337. DM 26.) Platon der Erzieher was first published in 1927. The present edition, with 240 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY the exception of the preface by Gaiser, is an exact reproduction of the earlier one. As a reviewer of the reissue, I feel myself obligated to formulate what seems to me relevant today. I remember that, when I read the first edition about the time of its appearance, I was full of admiration and felt myself indebted to the book for many years. Today it seems to me more dated than most writings on Plato of that period, including various publications of Stenzel. Criticizing Platon der Erzieher, I criticize what I once read differently. Julius Stenzel had earlier established his reputation as a Platonic scholar with his Studien zur Entwicklung der platonischen Dialektik von Sokrates zu Aristoteles (1917). This book as well as most of Stenzel's later investigations have exercised a considerable influence on international Platonic scholarship. In Germany it prefaced a new approach to ancient and especially to Platonic philosophy. In spite of the spadework done by German scholars in the nineteenth century and still by men like Apelt, Constantin Ritter and Theodor Gomperz, Plato's image in German thought about the end of the First World War was mainly determined by three sources: the neo-Kantian interpretation and Natorp's monograph in particular ; the highly original but very personal and philosophically naive "biography" of Wilamowitz-Moellendorff; and the vision of the Plato gestalt by the George circle. Stenzel dedicated the Studien to Wilamowitz and, while paying his respect to Natorp, stated that in contrast to the philosophical Plato interpretation of the Marburg school, he had chosen a philological and historical approach. As for the George circle, he did not acknowledge its significance, though I believe that at least in his later works he was indirectly influenced by it. In the years following World War I, it became important that Stenzel and... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.1 (2001) 149-151 [Access article in PDF] Reinhard Brandt. Kritischer Kommentar zu Kants Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht (1798). Kant-Forschungen, Band 10. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1999. Pp. 543. Cloth, DM. The appearance of a commentary on Kant's Anthropology is very timely, indeed indispensable, given the advent of a new phase in Kant scholarship, attentive to the writings surrounding the main (...) critical texts as a way of gaining a more comprehensive understanding of his thought. This new approach has been partly precipitated by the 1997 release of Volume 25 of the Academy edition containing the student transcriptions of Kant's anthropology lectures spanning a period of twenty-four years. The Anthropology is especially important for understanding Kant's moral philosophy. From 1773 forward, Kant himself never taught morality without concurrently offering his course in anthropology. His own students were thus cognizant of Kant's conception of human nature. Yet during the last 200 years few have paid attention to what sort of being, in Kant's view, was called upon to fulfill the moral vocation. As Brandt points out, the Anthropology has previously provoked no notable study, no discussion among either advocates or detractors.The precise nature of the relation between the Anthropology and Kant's critical philosophy remains an open question. Brandt himself is skeptical about the importance of the Anthropology for moral philosophy. He argues against seeing an integrated relation between the Anthropology and the critical system. For Brandt, the two stand alongside each other. The pragmatic anthropology serves merely as an "encyclopedia of the Kantian philosophy on an empirical level," providing an empirical discussion of its problems (8). He also argues that the pragmatic anthropology is neither identical with the anthropology required as a discipline supplementary to pure moral philosophy (14) [End Page 149] nor with the transcendental anthropology providing the self-knowledge of understanding reason (17). The seeming hallmarks of Kant's thought, such as the triadic structure of cognition, feeling, and desire, are simply an omnipresent "psychological division of European cultural history" (99-100) and so unpersuasive as evidence for a systematic connection of the texts. Anthropology has no "idea of reason" as its "basis." It begins in empirical psychology (especially Baumgarten's) and in Kant's effort to separate it from this discipline as a distinct, "pragmatic discipline" with the goal of "facilitating the prudent action of future world citizens" (9, 11). Brandt's interpretation probably influences his selection of passages from the critical philosophy referenced in his Kommentar.The commentary sets Kant's Anthropology in the historical context of Western thought, identifying related passages in texts which Kant is known to have read, as well as materials unfamiliar to him, but still pertinent for a given theme. Over 400 primary sources (from Homer and the philosophers of antiquity, to such recent writers as Richard Rorty) are referenced, as well as over 300 authors in the secondary literature. The commentary is critical, including in its textual analysis differences between the 1798 and 1800 published editions of the Anthropology, and comparisons with the manuscript in Kant's own hand (now located in Rostock). Marginalia are noted, and in some cases passages struck from Kant's manuscript are reproduced in the Kommentar; one such particularly long passage pertains to Kant's discussion of sensibility as contrasted with the understanding (175-181). Parallel passages are identified in Kant's other writings, including his published works, Reflexionen, correspondence, and other lecture notes. These include references to the anthropology lecture notes compiled in Volume 25, thus making the commentary helpful for someone investigating shifts and developments in Kant's treatment of a given topic. The historical context is also quite helpful for understanding the very concepts of "anthropology" (49-63), "pragmatic" (53), and "application" (57). Brandt concludes that with regard to its sources, Kant's anthropology is a "literary anthropology" (85) and that its central thematic is "the human being as an acting being" (89).Brandt offers very interesting and helpful discussions of various topics, with helpful citations, which... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Logik-Vorlesung: Unveröffentlichte Nachschriften I (Logik Bauch), and Logik-Vorlesung: Unveröffentlichte Nachschriften II (Logik Hechsel, Warschauer Logik)Hoke RobinsonTillmann Pinder, editor. Logik-Vorlesung: Unveröffentlichte Nachschriften I (Logik Bauch), and Logik-Vorlesung: Unveröffentlichte Nachschriften II (Logik Hechsel, Warschauer Logik), vols. 8 and 9 of the series Kant-Forschungen, general editors Reinhard Brandt and Werner Stark. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998. Vol. 8, pp. lxx + 268; vol. 9, pp. vii + 718. (...) NP.Between 1755, when he received the venia legendi, and 1796, when he ended his teaching activity, Kant taught logic some 30 times. In accordance with the requirements of the Prussian ministry of culture, his course lectures were built around a recognized text, G. F. Meier's 1752 Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre. Kant did not merely present Meier's views, however, but commented on and criticized these as he thought appropriate; his own copy of Meier was full of marginal notes and interleaved with notes on separate bits of paper. When in 1799 he entrusted G. B. Jäsche with this material for the compiling of a logic text, the thought was presumably of a Kantian logic organized around Meier's framework.Since logic plays such a prominent role in the Critical philosophy, one would expect the Jäsche logic to be viewed as an important tool for the interpretation of the Critical philosophy. But dissatisfaction with it was evident right from its original publication in 1800, and later scholars were even more negative (in 1913 Erich Adickes referred to it [End Page 603] as "the contrivance [Machwerk]... that Jäsche published under the name of Kant's logic," Erich Adickes, quoted in Ak. XXIV.960). And in fact, as Pinder's careful and detailed introduction points out, the nature and origin of the Jäsche logic presented a serious problem for Wilhelm Dilthey's organization of the now-standard Akademie-Ausgabe (Kants gesammelte Schriften, herausgegeben von der königlich preussischen [now: deutschen] Akademie der Wissenschaften. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1902- Cited as "Ak.").Dilthey conceived of four divisions of the Akademie-Ausgabe: Kant's published writings, his correspondence, his literary remains ("handschriftlicher Nachlass") and his lectures ("Vorlesungen"). Where, exactly, did the Jäsche logic belong? Kant had himself compiled a similar text from his lecture notes on anthropology, and this text was published in the first division (in volume VII). But did the Jäsche logic count as Kant's work? It was indeed authorized by Kant and based on Kant's own lecture notes; but these notes themselves were to be published in the Nachlass division. Furthermore, as it turned out, Jäsche had also employed manuscripts compiled from the lectures themselves, and these were to be published in the Vorlesungen division. This would not include his own transcription, as Erdmann had conjectured. It turns out Jäsche never heard Kant lecture on logic—he was never in Königsberg when they were being held! (xxvi, n. 29). The resulting controversies delayed the publication of the Jäsche logic in vol. IX from 1908 until 1923, after the 1914 publication in the Nachlass division of the notes on which it was based.Dilthey's projected Vorlesungen division itself was called into question by Benno Erdmann, Dilthey's successor as Akademie-Ausgabe general editor. Erdmann recognized the questionable nature of the Jäsche logic and the other compilations, but considered Dilthey's aim for a "critically secured" edition of the lecture manuscripts as "hopeless." Still, interest in the manuscripts resulted in their piecemeal publication independently of the Akademie-Ausgabe, and when the Nachlass division's publication had been completed in 1955, the Vorlesungen division was resurrected. Vol. XXIV (in two parts) appeared in 1966; it contained the logics Blomberg, Philippi, Pölitz, Busolt, Dohna-Wundlacken and the Vienna logic, the short logic Herder, and fragments of the lost logics Hintz and Hoffmann. The Pinder volumes reviewed here contain the logics Bauch, Hechsel, and the Warsaw logic.What exactly are the manuscripts in question? If Kant had been concerned merely to explicate Meier, his students could perhaps have been content with their marginal notes in the text and a few further ones for elucidation. But... (shrink)

A new and critical edition of Hegel’s Religionsphilosophie Vorlesungen is in preparation. These important lectures will also appear in English and Spanish translation concurrently with the German edition. Walter Jaeschke of the Hegel-Archiv staff is constructing the German text, to be published by Felix Meiner Verlag ; Peter C. Hodgson of Vanderbilt University is editing the English translation; Ricardo Ferrara of the University of Buenos Aires is editing the Spanish translation. Jaeschke, Hodgson and Ferrara have entered into (...) an agreement regarding common editorial principles for the different language versions. Jaeschke explained the background and some of the guiding principles of the project in a two-part article printed in the 1980 Owl. Hodgson followed the second part of Jaeschke’s article with his own statement of procedures for the English translation. My purpose in this paper is to provide an update to Hodgson’s statement by giving additional information about the new edition, a progress report on work on the English translation, and a foretaste of some of the interesting differences which are emerging as the distinct lecture series become clearly and accurately distinguished from one another for the first time. (shrink)

Nous traduisons l’article de Vaihinger « Wie die Philosophie des Als Ob entstand », paru dans Die deutsche Philosophie der Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellungen, Raymund Schmidt (éd.), Leipzig, Felix Meiner Verlag, 1921, tome 2, pp. 1–29. Cet article autobiographique retrace le parcours intellectuel de Hans Vaihinger dont la « philosophie du comme si », qui prend sa source majeure dans la pensée de Kant, connaît aujourd’hui une grande vitalité sous la figure du fictionalisme.

Reinhard Heckmann: Kants Kategoriendeduktion. Ein Beitrag zu einer Philosophie des Geistes, 484 Seiten, Freiburg/münchen 1997 [Verlag Karl Alber]. Immanuel Kant: Religion within the boundaries of mere reason and other writings, translated and edited by Allen Wood, George Di Giovanni; with an introduction by Robert Merrihew Adams. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998; XXXIX, 229 Seiten. Hermann Berger: Leeswijzer bij de Kritiek van de Oordeelskracht, Tilburg: Tilburg University Press 1997, 331 S. Martin Bondeli: Der Kantianismus des jungen Hegel. Die Kant-Aneignung und (...) Kant-Überwindung Hegels auf seinem Weg zum philosophischen System, Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg 1997, 353 S., ISBN 3-7873-1335-4 . Pierre Kerszberg: Critique and Totality. Albany 1997, 274 S. Nathan Rotenstreich: Synthesis and Intentional Objectivity. On Kant and Husserl. Dordrecht / Boston / London: Kluwer Academic Publishers 1998, viii + 135 pages. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.2 (2002) 256-257 [Access article in PDF] Book Review Die Struktur des menschlichen Geistes nach Augustinus: Selbstreflexion und Erkenntnis Gottes in "De Trinitate" Johannes Brachtendorf. Die Struktur des menschlichen Geistes nach Augustinus: Selbstreflexion und Erkenntnis Gottes in "De Trinitate." Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2000. Pp. viii + 335. Cloth, DM 128,00. "The Trinity" is arguably Augustine's (philosophically) most demanding work. (...) Yet it is precisely its philosophical quality that is nowadays sometimes called in question for its apparent lack of argumentative coherence. H. I. Marrou has even expressed the view that this may have been intended, as the text is designed as an exercitatioanimi, a spiritual-mental exercise; i.e., the argumentative gaps are deliberately left open to be filled in by whoever undergoes the exercise. This would mean that "The Trinity" lacks any philosophical or theological position or doctrine in particular, and that it must not be judged by the standards of philosophical discourse, even those of Augustine's own day and age. Brachtendorf sets out with a revision of that view. Augustine, he argues, does indeed formulate a particular position. The impression that there may be gaps in his arguments could well stem from a misunderstanding of some of them. Augustine, Brachtendorf reports in his first chapter (1), developed his teaching of the triune God in close contact with the philosophy of Plotinus. However, he distanced himself from Plotinus by analyzing the process of cognition not by taking as an example the divine nous, but the menshumana. Apart from that he developed an ontology of the Trinity (2) and only then analyzed the human mind in analogy to it (3-4). He also looked into the relationship of mind and language ("word") (5) and developed further some aspects of this relationship such as the trinitarian structure of the human mind (6), the relationship of knowledge and wisdom (7), the human mind as the image of God (8), the self-reflection of the human mind (9), language as an expression of that self-reflection in the image of God (10), and the concept of the "inner word" (11).Brachtendorf concludes with an appeal not to read into Augustine's link of notitia and amor that he was interested in the analysis of self-knowledge merely for ethical reasons. Amor, he argues, expressly includes operations of the intellect. Augustine's interest was therefore genuinely theoretical and intellectualist. Amor, for Augustine, was a force that creates knowledge as such, no matter what the content. Its impact is practical and theoretical. Referring to the works of Charles Taylor, Martin Heidegger, Max Scheler, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Hannah Arendt, Brachtendorf demonstrates how influential Augustine was with this aspect of his thought in the development of "Subjekt"-centered philosophies in the twentieth century. Yet, as influential as this approach may have been in this particular field, arguing, as it did, for the ontological character of human subjectivity (i.e., that the human mind was naturally structured in a trinitarian way, but had to make its natural intelligence explicit in thought through the learning of language) it did not revolutionize [End Page 256] the understanding of language. In consequence it did not impress the philosophers of the linguistic turn, and that is probably why today the argument of "The Trinity" is so often found wanting.Pointing back to the source Brachtendorf's study is a welcome contribution to the subject and a useful guide for all who now--hopefully, and encouraged by this work--set out for themselves to have a (closer) look at the original. Josef Lössl Catholic University Leuven... (shrink)

Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 184-211, Herausgegeben von L. Sturlese Unter Mitarbeit von A. Punzi, Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg 2014.

Discours prononcé par Helmholtz en 1862 pour la prise de fonction de prorecteur à l’université de Heidelberg. Le texte original de référence est : Hermann von Helmholtz, « Über das Verhältnis der Naturwissenschaften zur Gesammtheit der Wissenschaft » (1862), in _Philosophische und populärwissenschaftliche Schriften_, 3 vol., Michael Heidelberger, Helmut Pulte und Gregor Schiemann (éds.), Hamburg : Felix Meiner Verlag, 2017, vol. 1, p. 181–207. Nous indiquons entre crochets dans la marge la pagination allemande de cette édition (NdT).

This edition of the early diaries of Rudolf Carnap (1891–1970), which are housed in the Carnap estate at the University of Pittsburgh, was published in two volumes by Felix Meiner Verlag Hamburg in 2021 and 2022. These are also the first two volumes of the Meiner Edition Schriften aus dem Nachlass von Rudolf Carnap. The title of these two volumes is succinctly Rudolf Carnap. Tagebücher (Rudolf Carnap. Diaries), supplemented by the respective indication of the volume. Volume (...) 1 (approx. 600 pages) comprises the diaries from 1908 to 1919, Volume 2 (approx. 900 pages) those from 1920 to 1935. With these volumes, the diaries of one of the central thinkers of the Vienna Circle and Logical Empiricism become accessible to a wider circle of researchers and interested parties. While the diaries were previously only partially accessible, they have now for the first time been released in their entirety in the form of a proper text-critical edition. The editor is Christian Damböck with the collaboration of Brigitte Arden, Roman Jordan, Brigitte Parakenings and Lois M. Rendl. Text transcriptions of the originals, which Carnap had written in shorthand, served as the basis for the edition. The transcription was done by Brigitte Parakenings and Brigitte Arden, further editing by Lois M. Rendl and Roman Jordan. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.3 (2003) 419-420 [Access article in PDF] Martin Mulsow. Moderne aus dem Untergrund: Radikale Frühaufklärung in Deutschland, 1680-1720. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2002. Pp. x + 514. Paper, € 58.00.This is a marvelous, detailed, textured study of a large number of minor works and minor figures that developed and transmitted many of the elements of modern philosophy in early modern (...) Germany. Many of the texts were written in Latin, and only some were published. One should not teach the philosophy of the Enlightenment from Hazard or Cassirer without attention to these figures, whom they did not know. Now we know where our heroes like Lessing, Hume, and Kant got many of their fundamental ideas.Martin Mulsow ends this book with ten theses. The first holds that most of the authors discussed were radicalized in a multi-layered process, not simply from the reading of Hobbes, Spinoza, Bayle, or Toland. For example, one could take the role of an opponent in an academic disputation, and bit by bit begin to believe one's unorthodox role. Or one could be provoked by ultra-orthodox opponents to explore the opposite of what they believed. Some authors evolved into and out of radical positions over the course of their lives.Further theses contend that small, trusted circles of friends were often the enabling condition in which unorthodox views were first expressed and then hammered out. Irony, satire, humor, paradox, and ambivalence played key roles. It is often difficult to tell whether some of these texts were serious or intended as jokes, and perhaps the authors did not always know themselves. Some radical ideas were spread simply by curious erudites who assembled collections and bibliographies of radical manuscripts and texts without believing them.Mulsow shows how people wrote on controversial topics in coded scholarly language. Spinozism was discussed under the rubrics of Platonism and Stoicism; the sovereignty of the people was considered in terms of the lex regia; and Biblical criticism became code for the physicians' rejection of the materiality of the soul. Thus philosophical discourse can be found where one might least expect it in legal, philological, historical, and scientific debates. The numerous case studies that the author assembles amount to philosophical microhistory.Substantial chapters deal with various aspects of the intellectual stew that emerged from the bubbling pot of Jews and Socinians and other Christian sects that were semi-tolerated in the Netherlands. Unlike any construction of moderate and radical positions as opposed and at odds, Mulsow shows how they were often intertwined. The destruction of Christian Platonism, the paradoxical development of Enlightenment ideas out of anti-humanism, and the uses of so-called eclecticism in philosophy made possible the assembly of modern philosophical positions.In yet another paradox, many of these writers belong to what has been called the "conservative Enlightenment," intending only to temporize and draw the teeth of the political and philosophical radicals, and yet their writings systematized and transmitted the ideas of the radicals, opening the way to further radicality. It is a perennial weakness of the skeptics and proto-liberals like Gundling that they defended freedom of thought and libertas philosophandi even where it would undermine the ideas and institutions in which they believed.Most of the philosophically radical positions began as critiques of theological positions, and this is one reason why it is ever more apparent that one cannot understand the rise of modern philosophy without a close acquaintance with early modern theology. None of the early modern philosophers we are trying to understand was ignorant of the many levels of theological debate. There are numerous connections to later times: for example, a seventeenth-century debate over political theology anticipated Carl Schmitt's twentieth-century rediscovery of this topos.Mulsow places the Enlightened ideas of Locke and Newton in the context of their basis in the theology of anti-Trinitarian Socinians and Arians such as Samuel Crell. This was as important to many who radicalized it as the Spinozism credited with spawning the radical... (shrink)

The new German edition of these lectures will constitute four volumes of the Felix Meiner Verlag series: G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen: Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte. The editors of these volumes, Pierre Garniron and Walter Jaeschke, chose the Berlin lectures of 1825–1826 to represent the history of philosophy lectures in this series. The University of California Press is publishing all of the series in English, including translations of the Religionsphilosophie and of the lectures on Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft, on Kunst, (...) and on Logik. The same group that did the Philosophy of Religion is continuing with the History of Philosophy, with some shifting of roles: Robert F. Brown, J. Michael Stewart, H.S. Harris, Peter C. Hodgson. This brief report outlines the nature of the project on the history of philosophy and the plans for its completion. (shrink)

The article evaluates the standard edition of Kant's Prolegomena and the Metaphysische Anfangsgründe, trying to show that their standard editions, as found in the fourth volume of the Academy Edition, are seriously flawed. Therefore, volume 4 should be part of the planned revision of the entire edition. Most striking are the defects and inconsistencies in the text of the Prolegomena. Extended philosophical and historical research has shown that this work in its present form cannot have been published with Kant's approval. (...) The text and the editorial apparatus of the Metaphysical Foundations also leave much to be desired. Until such a revision of the Academy Edition one is better advised to rely on the editions of these texts published by the Felix Meiner Verlag. (shrink)

MEDIEVAL AND RENAISSANCE LOGICALEXANDER BROADIE, Introduction to medieval logic. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987. vi + l5Opp. £20.00.CHARLES B. SCHMITT, QUENTIN SKINNER, ECKHARD KESSLER, JILL KRAYE, The Cambridge historj. of renaissance philosophj.. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, xiii + 968 pp. £5O.OO/$79.jO.GERMAN TRADITIONSSTEPHEN PRIEST, Hegel's critique of Kant. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987. xii + 229 pp. £22.50.NORBERT HINSKE, Kant 7 Index, Band 2, Stellenindex und Konkordanz zu “Zmmanuel Kant's Logik”. Erstellt in Zusammenarbeit mit Heinrich P. Delfosse und Heinz Schay. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: (...) Frommann-Holzboog, 1986. xlviii + 633 pp. DM 475.FREGE STUDIESGOTTLOB FREGE, Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik. Eine logisch mathematische Untersuchung über den Begrif der Zahl. Centenarausgabe. Mit ergänzenden Texten kritisch herausgegeben von Christian Thiel. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1986. 187 + Ixiii. pp. DM 120.G. WECHSUNG, Frege Conference 1984. Berlin: Akademic Verlag, 1984. 408 pp. DDR-DM5 1.ANGLO–SAXON TRADITIONSN. B. COCCHIARELLA, Logical studies in early analytic philosophy. Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1987. 295 pp. $30.00.PAUL GOCHET, Ascent to truth. A critical exumination of Quine‘s philosophy. Miinchen: Philosophia Verlag, 1986. 201 pp. DM59.BARRY M. TAYLOR, Michael Dummett: contributions to philosophy. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987. xii+ 339 pp. £47.25.OBJECTS OF THOUGHTB. HALE,objects. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987; New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988. viii + 282pp. £27.50.ANTHONY PALMER, Concept and object. The unity of the proposition in logic and psychology. London and New York: Routledge, 1988. xvi + 144 pp. £19.95.NON–CLASSICAL LOGICSG. PRIEST, In contradiction: a study of the transconsistent. Dordrecht, Boston, Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987. xvf 279 pp. $49.50.JÜRGEN WALTHER, Logik der Fragen, Berlin, New York: de Gruyter, 1985. viii + 334pp. DM 98.MISCELLANEOUSF. ENRIQUES, Per la storia della logica. Photostatic reproduction of the 1922 edition. Foreword by Raffaella Simili. Bologna: Zanichelli, 1987. xxii + 302 pp. 18,000 Lire.PAUL WEINGARTNER and GERHARD SCHURZ, Logic, philosophy of science and epistemology. Proceedings of the 11th International Wittgenstein Symposium, 4th to 13th August 1986, Kirchberg am Wechsel. Selected papers. Vienna: Holder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1987. 430 pp. £54.00.G. TAKEUTI, Proof theory. Second edition. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1987. 490 pp. $64.00. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Werke, and: Vol. 1, Schriften zum Spinozastreit (1998), and: Vol. 2, Schriften zum transzendentalen Idealismus (2004), and: Vol. 3, Schriften zum Streit um die göttlichen Dinge und ihre Offenbarung (2000)Rolf AhlersFriedrich Heinrich Jacobi. Werke. Edited by Klaus Hammacher and Walter Jaeschke. Vol. 1, Schriften zum Spinozastreit ( 1998). Vol. 2, Schriften zum transzendentalen Idealismus ( 2004). Vol. 3, Schriften zum Streit um die göttlichen Dinge und ihre Offenbarung (...) ( 2000). Pp. x + 640. Cloth, € 168,00 (Vol. 1). Pp. vii + 823. Cloth, € 264,00 (Vol. 2). Pp. vi + 262. Cloth, € 78,00 (Vol. 3). Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, 2000, 2004.The new critical Jacobi Werke Ausgabe (JWA), accompanied by four volumes of the still incomplete Briefwechsel (in progress at Frommann-Holzboog Publishers since 1981), is a masterpiece of research on Jacobi, early German Idealism and early Romanticism. Now [End Page 491] available are Volumes I, II and III. Volume I (1998) carries the title Schriften zum Spinozastreit and contains Jacobi's Spinozabriefe in the three editions of 1785, 1789, and 1819, Wider Mendelssohns Beschuldigungen of 1786, and the Vorbericht (Preface) of the third edition of the Spinozabriefe of 1819. The running text of all writings contains all editions, variant readings clearly identifiable with page references in the margins, subscripted to identify the various editions. This method enables the identification of various disputes which Jacobi provoked and in which his writings played a role. The Anhang, appendix, to all texts contains a) a list of abbreviations, and b) the editorial principles used and also a description of the circumstances leading to the writing of the texts. But the bulk of the Anhang of each volume is c) the "Kommentar," the commentary. It provides the key to the highly nuanced and, without guidance, the often cryptic allusions and references of Jacobi's texts. This commentary (separately bound in Volumes I and II) really brings Jacobi's work to life. The end of the Anhang contains d) a bibliography of all works mentioned not only by Jacobi himself but also emerging in the literary debate unlocked by the commentary, as well as e) an extensive index of names. Volume II (2004) is Schriften zur Transzendentalphilosophie, and contains David Hume of 1787, the Sendschreiben an Fichte, Ueberflüssiges Taschenbuch, both of 1799, and other essays such as Three Letters to Köppen of 1803. Volume III (2000) is Schriften zum Streit um die Göttlichen Dinge and contains mainly the famous essay Von den Göttlichen Dingen of 1811 plus three other writings. This book deals with the controversy between Schelling and Jacobi while both were at Munich. Other major works of Jacobi, such as the novel Allwill, are to follow in later volumes.This critical edition of Fr. H. Jacobi (1743–1819) definitively revises the standard interpretation of the man and his work. The standard interpretation (advocated by such figures as Fr. Schlegel, Moses Mendelssohn, and H. Heine) views his thought as promoting irrationalism, specifically a religious irrationalism of faith, taking form in "personalism." Heine spoke of Jacobi as a "whiney old biddy." Fr. Schlegel characterized Jacobi's salto mortale as the "leap into the arms of divine mercy," promoting an irrational "philosophical non-philosophy" (KFSA XVIII 13, Nr. 101). Schlegel criticized Jacobi at the very end of in his Woldemar Review of 1796 thus: "So (Jacobi's) Woldemar is really an invitation to meet God..., and (his) theological masterpiece ends, as do all moral excesses, with a salto mortale... into the abyss of divine mercy" (Früher Idealismus und Frühromantik PlS I.1, ed. W. Jaeschke [Hbg: Meiner, 1995], 270). Carl Philipp Moritz credited Jacobi with "fanaticism and superstition."In contrast, Jacobi himself was quite critical of this characterization of his thought, especially in the Sendschreiben of 1799, and earlier in his Briefe. Jacobi already in 1786 thought it was "outrageous" for Mendelssohn to suggest he surrenders a philosophy of reason in favor of the Christian faith, or worse. He addresses this problem, which is still today the dominant view of the "irrationality" of his "leap," with admirable clarity in his letter to Neeb of May 30, 1817: "I do not at all advocate a head-first... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:116 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Der Begriff des Lebens bei Plotin. By Grigorios Ph. Kostaras. (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1969. Pp. ix+139. DM 36) In his excellent book, The Concept of Life in Plotinus, Mr. Grigorios Ph. Kostaras presents the thesis that it is the problem of life which lies at the center of the thought of Plotinus, that it permeates it in its entirety and that (...) he views all other philosophical problems from its perspective. The two main metaphysical questions of Greek philosophy, "Why is there something rather than nothing?" and "What then is man?" appear in a new light when seen from this central concept. The result is a universe which is like a living organism, a unity in its multiplicity whose many forms of life are held together by one life principle, the soul. Human life, the human soul is part of this organism and therefore able to find in it its greatest bliss. The soul, for Plotinus, is the necessary condition that there be life. It is the ground of all macrocosmic and microcosmic entities, being essentially movement, it is the creative and formgiving principle of all that is, it is the law of life. The reduction of the many to the one seemed to Plotinus a logical necessity if man is to grasp the origin and continuity of the cosmos. His new reality, "The One," fills this logical need. Out of its perfection and fullness emanates Mind (Nous) "like light from the sun." This gives rise to the soul as its logos and substance. The physical universe is the result of the soul's movement towards "the Other," matter on which it imprints the forms of the intelligible world.thus shaping and ordering the world as we know it. In this activiO/ the soul remains one and whole; the "many," the concrete life forms of reproduction and perception appear as a result of its relation to matter. What makes for this creative, formgiving activity which is its movement away from the One and lqous, from identity towards diversity, from eternity to time? The Plotinian answer, as Mr. Kostaras sees it, is both exuberant and tragic. The soul becomes the shaper of all there is through its striving towards freedom and independence and its joy in the manifold appearances which its relation to matter brings about. The soul's biological movement then is an affirmation and celebration of temporal life as one of its manifestations. Yet, at the same time, this movement is unfree since it follows a need the soul cannot avoid. Thus it means estrangement from its true life of the logos. The soul is isolated and "sick" of which the incessant movement of becoming, of changing from one form of life to another is the result. It leads a negative or pseudo life. Suffering, then, must be inextricably joined to the beauty of temporal life. True life, therefore, is the life of the mind. It is life as the soul's movement toward itself rather than the outer world, life become conscious of itself, leading out of the sensible world, back to identity with Nous and ultimately with the One. In this, its highest movement, the soul severs itself from time. In it there is no past nor future but an eternal Now, no moving image but reality itself. Such is the ground and explanation of the universe, the metaphysical framework within which man may choose his being. As microcosm within the macrocosm, he is a composite of Nous, soul-substance and bodily nature. The relation between these three principles forms the ground of human life; the manner in which man chooses to link them to one another makes for the differences between the modes of life of human beings. The movement of the human soul towards the outer world and its absorption in becoming means the realization of man as bodily being only. His life is ruled by perceptions and the beliefs based upon them. His feelings are uncontrolled, his mind inactive. He lives the life of the fleeting moment, a mere shadow of its reality. Just as the soul or life principle of the cosmos links the intelligible to the sensible... (shrink)